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Gradualism: 
A  Mid-Course  View 
THE  IMPLEMENTATION  of  the  economic  policies  labeled  "gradual- 
ism" may be said to date from the enactment of the income tax surcharge 
in June 1968. But the original expectations, in retrospect called "hopes," 
that the gradualist policies would have "worked" by the summer of 1970 
have not been fulfilled. It now appears that the real test of the gradualist 
policies will be economic performance over the next several years. Un- 
fortunately, therefore, a mid-course rather than a retrospective view is all 
that can now be attempted. 
This examination of gradualism will be limited to the aggregate output 
and price level goals of policy; balance-of-payments and other goals are 
completely neglected. The first section will be devoted to a general discus- 
sion of the issues, with special emphasis on the distinction between goal- 
gradualism and instrument-gradualism.  Goal-gradualism refers to policies 
designed, in the present context, to achieve a gradual reduction in inflation 
and thereby to avoid the high level of unemployment that a rapid reduction 
of inflation would require. Instrument-gradualism  refers to policies involv- 
ing gradual adjustment of the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy, 
that is, of government expenditures and tax rates, and of the money stock 
and other financial variables. 
* I wish to acknowledge,  in addition  to the assistance  from the Brookings  panel, the 
help of Jared  Enzler  and Laura  D'Andrea,  who ran  the many  required  simulations  of the 
FRB-MIT-Penn  model, and Barbara  McFadden, who handled various programming 
chores. The analysis and the views expressed  here are the responsibility  solely of the 
author, and should not be interpreted  as necessarily  reflecting  the views of those who 
assisted  him,  of the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  or of the Division 
of Research  and Statistics. 
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In the second section the topic is the nature of the monetary policies 
consistent with a goal-gradualist result. The analysis is based on simula- 
tions of the FRB-MIT-Penn econometric model of the United States, here- 
after referred to simply as "the model."' In order to concentrate on the 
broad, long-range problems of adjusting  to a lower rate of inflation without 
creating excessive unemployment, the simulations are run for a seven-year 
period, from the first quarter of 1969 through the fourth quarter of 1975. 
Simulation over this period requires that numerous assumptions be made 
about the behavior of the exogenous variables. The assumptions used are 
considered reasonable for the purposes of the broad view intended, but no 
effort has been spent on the details of time paths of exogenous variables or 
on making the minor adjustments in constant terms in equations, and so 
on, that are necessary when the model is used for short-run forecasts. 
While the primary purpose of the section is to provide a broad view of 
the problems of achieving gradual adjustment,  the first part briefly reviews 
the 1969:1-1970:2  period. Simulation of the model over this period using 
the actual values of the exogenous variables suggests that aggregate de- 
mand has been stronger than would have been expected from past experi- 
ence as incorporated in the model. 
An examination of instrument-gradualism  appears in the next section. 
While the concept of goal-gradualism  is clearly more fundamental, instru- 
ment-gradualism nevertheless raises important issues. No  one would be 
opposed to abrupt alterations in the settings of the policy instruments if it 
were certain that they would achieve the desired gradual adjustments  in the 
goal variables. But the whole case for instrument-gradualism  is based on 
uncertainty, and it is a case that cannot be ignored. 
It should be emphasized that all of the analysis based on the model is 
1. The model used in this study  is the new version  of the FRB-MIT-Penn  model that 
was completed  in the spring  of 1970.  The behavior  of this model  is not completely  under- 
stood since the large number  of simulation  experiments  needed fully to investigate  its 
properties  have yet to be run. At this time no published  description  of the model is 
available,  although a monograph  is in preparation.  The current  version of the model, 
however,  shares  many  of the features  of earlier  versions.  For a description  of these  earlier 
versions see  Frank de  Leeuw and Edward Gramlich, "The Federal Reserve-MIT 
Econometric Model," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 54 (January 1968), pp.  11-40; 
Robert H. Rasche  and Harold T. Shapiro,  "The F.R.B.-M.I.T.  Econometric  Model: Its 
Special Features,"  in American  Economic Association,  Papers and Proceedings  of the 
Eightieth  Annual  Meeting, 1967 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 58, May 1268), pp. 
123-49; and Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani,  "Econometric  Analysis of Stabiliza- 
tion Policies,"  in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of the  Eighty- 
first Annual  Meeting,  1968  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59, May 1969),  pp. 296-314. Gradualism: A Mid-Course View  273 
speculative, in the sense that it is not known how faithfully the model rep- 
resents the economy. Nevertheless, there will be relatively little discussion 
of the model per se, but rather the simulations will be used to suggest policy 
approaches. To proceed otherwise would make this paper an examination 
of the model rather than of the policy of gradualism. 
The Meanings of Gradualism 
The policy of gradualism  represents a new advance in public understand- 
ing of economic stabilization policy. Unlike  their approach to  previous 
anti-inflation crusades in the postwar period, politicians and the informed 
public now clearly recognize that excessive zeal in fighting inflation will pro- 
duce excessive unemployment. This public concern about how economic 
policy instruments ought to  be  adjusted is the logical  sequel to  public 
acceptance that policy instruments exist and ought to be used. 
The prescription of  gradualism involves the maintenance of  firm but 
mild restraint until the objectives of anti-inflationary  policy are realized. 
Real output is to be maintained somewhat below potential until the rate of 
inflation declines to an acceptable level. But no one knows what adjust- 
ments of the policy instruments are required to achieve this gradualism in 
the paths of the goal variables. And some have confused goal-gradualism 
with instrument-gradualism.  "Firm but mild restraint" strongly suggests 
gradual and moderate changes in the settings of the instruments of policy, 
but such changes may not lead to the desired reduction of inflation while 
simultaneously avoiding excessive unemployment. 
It  may,  of  course, be  true that  goal-gradualism requires instrument- 
gradualism. This view is reinforced by the diagnosis of the current infla- 
tion. The problem was not that economic policy failed to offset some series 
of disturbances in the private economy; rather, fiscal policy became exces- 
sively expansionary because expenditures for the Vietnam war were not 
offset by tax increases or reductions in other expenditures; and monetary 
policy, as measured by the rate of growth of the money stock, became ex- 
cessively expansionary in an attempt to prevent interest rates from rising 
too  sharply. A tax increase in 1966 to cover the war expenditures and a 
moderate, steady rate of growth in the money stock in the 1965-68 period 
would have helped immensely. If government economic policies, as mea- 
sured by the full employment surplus and the rate of growth of the money 274  William Poole 
stock, had been steady, or had changed relatively little and then only grad- 
ually rather than abruptly, the economic picture would have been much 
brighter in January 1969. 
But even if it is agreed that large and abrupt changes in the settings of 
policy  instruments contributed to  the inflationary problem, it  is by  no 
means clear that gradually restoring the instruments to "normal" settings 
is required to rectify the situation. Given the state of the economy in Jan- 
uary 1969, abrupt changes in the policy instruments might have been re- 
quired to produce gradual adjustment of the goal variables. In fact, I will 
argue that the shifts in the settings of the policy instruments  between 1968 
and 1969 must be viewed as the most deflationary change in policy since 
1947. I will also argue that this sharp deflationary  change was broadly justi- 
fied by the conditions facing policy makers in January 1969. But the abrupt 
change in policy was justified only because the initial conditions were so 
unsatisfactory. The distinction between goal-gradualism and instrument- 
gradualism is, therefore, essential if improper inferences about the general 
appropriateness of abrupt changes in policy instruments are to be avoided. 
Although  the  distinction between goal-  and instrument-gradualism is 
obvious enough to most professional economists, the confounding of the 
two concepts in public debate is readily apparent. The confusion may be 
illustrated by statements from the Joint Economic Committee hearings on 
the 1969 Economic Report of the President, held in February 1969. In his 
statement, Paul W. McCracken, Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, consistently uses the gradualism concept in the goal sense. For 
example, McCracken says that the third, and preferable, of three alterna- 
tive courses of action is "to embark upon a course of gradually and per- 
sistently reducing the rate of inflation and thereby generating the expecta- 
tion of diminishing rates of inflation in the future."2  But later, in response to 
committee questioning, McCracken is not  quite so  clear when he says, 
"We are hopeful that if we pursue a careful and gradual approach to this 
problem that the adverse effect on unemployment will not be large."3 
While McCracken's position is generally one of goal-gradualism, others 
are quite clearly thinking of instrument-gradualism.  In the same hearings, 
2. The 1969 Economic  Report  of the President,  Hearings  before the Joint Economic 
Committee,  91 Cong. 1 sess. (1969), Pt. 2, p. 291. (Hereafter,  this document.is cited as 
1969  JEC Hearings.) 
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David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, says, "We are all conscious 
of the risks of abrupt and blunt action that could bring unnecessary un- 
employment. We mean to avoid that. But we are equally conscious of the 
risks of not moving decisively...  ."4  In a similar vein, George L. Bach, pro- 
fessor of economics at Stanford University, in his testimony said, "One 
may hope that the Fed has learned from these experiences [in 1966-68] the 
dangers of abrupt large shifts in policy, and the virtues of gradualism."5 
Since the two concepts of gradualism were not sharply distinguished in 
the hearings, it is not surprising  that they are confused in the report of the 
Joint Economic Committee. While the majority views never adequately 
distinguishes the two  concepts, the confounding is most  obvious in the 
minority views. In this section nearly adjacent sentences on the same page 
read as follows: "Inflation can and must be reduced in a manner consistent 
with high employment." "Fiscal policy restraint,  firm but gradual, is essen- 
tial." [emphasis in original] "Monetary restraint should be applied grad- 
ually until there are visible signs that inflation is slowing, and must avoid 
another 'credit crunch.' "6 
The  simulations in  the  following  sections demonstrate the  great im- 
portance of  distinguishing goal-gradualism from instrument-gradualism. 
They reveal that instrument-gradualism  produces abrupt changes in the 
goal variables, while gradual adjustment of goal variables requires abrupt 
changes in monetary policy. As  is emphasized below, these results stem 
primarily  from the abnormal conditions at the beginning of the simulation 
period, and thus cannot be interpreted as providing evidence for the de- 
sirability of abrupt policy changes under normal circumstances. 
Goal-Gradualism 
What sort of monetary policy would have been necessary starting in the 
first quarter of 1969 to achieve a gradual reduction of inflation while avoid- 
ing excessive unemployment? To explore this question the model has been 
simulated  from 1969: 1 through 1975:4 under assumptions about the values 
4. Ibid.,  Pt. 2, p. 388. 
5. Ibid.,  Pt. 3, p. 541. 
6. 1969 Joint Economic  Report,  Report of the Joint Economic Committee on the 
January  1969 Economic  Report of the President,  91 Cong. 1 sess. (1969), p. 91. 276  William Poole 
of exogenous variables that policy makers might reasonably have made in 
January 1969. 
A  REVIEW  OF  1969-70 
First, however, it is interesting to examine a simulation that attempts to 
determine whether the economy remained stronger from 1969:1 through 
1970:2 than would have been expected from past experience as incorpo- 
rated in the model. This simulation, called simulation A to distinguish it 
from those examined later, uses the actual historical values of all of the 
exogenous  variables with  one  exception. The  exception is  the  tax  sur- 
charge, which is assumed to expire January 1,  1970, instead of June 30, 
1970, on the grounds that the model was estimated under the assumption 
that taxpayers considered all tax rates to be permanent,  while the surcharge 
was known to be temporary. A special import adjustment was also neces- 
sary, since imports, being endogenous in the model, are not affected in the 
simulation by the dock strike that substantially affects exports (an exog- 
enous variable) in 1969: 1. This adjustment arbitrarily  reduced the annual 
rate of imports by $5 billion in that quarter. 
The import and tax adjustments produce, if anything, an upward bias 
to simulation A. Even so, it is clear from Table 1 that simulation A involves 
a much more severe economic downturn than actually occurred. And the 
model results are not at variance with the predictions of most economists, 
both monetarists and fiscalists, in early 1969. In simulation A  the down- 
turn in real output in the third quarter of 1969 occurs four quarters after 
the imposition of the surcharge,  and two quarters  after the reduction in the 
rate of monetary growth; these lags seem about in line with past experi- 
ence. The actual downturn in real output did not occur until 1969:4, and 
then was quite small. This lag, while not completely outside the bounds 
of previous experience, appears to be longer than the average. 
A possible explanation for this longer lag is that the extensive discussion 
of gradualism reduced fears of recession and thereby reduced the speed of 
adjustment. Another explanation, however, is that the current situation is 
outside the realm of previous experience.  Except for those in which wartime 
controls were in effect, no period in twentieth century U.S. history exhibits 
both unemployment almost continuously below 4 percent and persistent 
inflation, as the interval from mid-1965 through 1968 does. The closest 
parallel is probably with  1955-57, but  at that time unemployment was Gradualism: A Mid-Course View  277 
Table 1.  Selected Economic Indicators, Actual and Simulation A, 
First Quarter 1969 through  Second Quarter 1970 
Dollar  amounts  in billions,  seasonally  adjusted annual rates 
1969  1970 
Economic  indicator  1  2  3  4  1  2 
Gross  national  product  in 
1958 dollars 
Simulation  A  $722.3  $729.1  $727.6  $721.5  $714.6  $709.1 
Actual  722.1  726.1  730.9  729.2  723.8  724.9 
Gross  national  product  in 
current  dollars 
Simulation  A  907.0  929.4  939.4  943.0  945.5  949.4 
Actual  907.6  923.7  942.6  951.7  959.5  971.1 
GNP deflator  (1958  =  100) 
Simulation  A  125.6  127.5  129.1  130.7  132.3  133.9 
Actual  125.7  127.2  129.0  130.5  132.6  133.9 
Three-month  Treasury 
bill yield 
Simulation  A  6.30%  7.03%  6.98%  6.49%  5.90O  5.91% 
Actual  6.09  6.19  7.01  7.35  7.21  6.67 
Sources: Actual-Economic  Indicators (September 1970), p. 2,  and Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol.  56 
(March and August 1970), p. A-33; simulation-see  text for assumptions. 
almost continuously above 4 percent and the rate of inflation (in terms of 
the GNP deflator) below 4 percent. It may be argued, then, that there is no 
way to judge whether the lag in 1969 was longer than normal because no 
comparable period is  available on  which to  form judgments about the 
length of "normal" lags under such conditions. 
Given the inflationary situation in early 1969, it seems likely that invest- 
ment remained stronger than anticipated in the face of restrictive mone- 
tary and fiscal policies as a result of the strength of inflationary expecta- 
tions and the extent of investment backlogs. For example, in the third and 
fourth quarters of 1969, when simulation A shows a weakening economy, 
the simulated spending on producers' structures (in constant dollars) is 
about 6 percent below actual, while that on producers' durable equipment 
is over 2 percent below actual. Similarly, nonfarm inventory investment is 
simulated almost $5 billion (annual rates in 1958 dollars) too low on aver- 
age for the same two quarters. 278  William Poole 
FRAMEWORK  AND  KEY  ASSUMPTIONS 
The remainder of this section explores what sort of policy would have 
been required starting in  1969: 1 to  achieve goal-gradualism, that is, the 
attainment of a desirable path for real GNP.  The exercise serves to press 
home the fact that goal-gradualism may require abrupt or even violent 
changes in the policy instruments. The analysis will take place within the 
context of the model and against the background of the world as it ap- 
peared at the beginning of 1969. 
As will be seen below, the monetary policy required for goal-gradualism 
from 1969:1 through 1970:2 is at first more restrictive, and then less re- 
strictive, than the policy actually followed in that period. In addition, the 
monetary policy required from  1970:3  to  1975:4  is  substantially more 
expansionary than anyone seems to  contemplate. These results must be 
interpreted primarily as an exercise, because of the unknown reliability of 
the model and because of the numerous assumptions that must be made 
about the exogenous variables. 
Explicit assumptions about fiscal policy underlie the simulation. These 
are basically taken from the 1970 Economic Report.7  The assumed federal 
expenditures are taken from Table 14 (p.  80), and the federal tax rates 
assumed involve tax cuts in order to produce a full employment surplus of 
1.1 percent of GNP  in 1973-75. It must be recognized that the fiscal as- 
sumptions are quite restrictive since real federal purchases of goods and 
services are assumed to decline out to 1975 and the full employment surplus 
is substantial. The decline in purchases is, in fact, unlikely to occur, and 
indeed in the Report the Council of Economic Advisers explicitly recog- 
nizes that, starting in 1973, resources will be available to permit either in- 
creases in federal spending or reductions in taxes. In the simulations, it was 
assumed that the latter course will be taken. These fiscal policy assump- 
tions, although not completely realistic, provide a useful base from which 
to explore alternative monetary policies, and it is necessary only to keep 
the nature of these assumptions in mind in judging the reasonableness of 
the simulations of alternative monetary policies.8 
7. Economic  Report  of the  President  together  with  the Annual  Report  of the Council  of 
Economic  Advisers,  February  1970, referred  to here as the 1970 Economic  Report, or 
simply  the Report. 
8. Simulations  were  also run using several  assumptions  about expenditures  increases. 
Since using these assumptions  produces only minor differences  in the nature of the 
monetary  policy consistent  with the desired  output path, these simulations  are not dis- 
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In  simulating the model to  1975, numerous assumptions about other 
exogenous variables are required. Every effort has been made within the 
time constraints to assure that these assumptions are reasonable, with the 
most effort being spent on the variables that have a relatively large impact 
on the results.9 
It has also been necessary to choose between alternative forms that have 
been estimated for several equations of the model. And finally, the standard 
equation for the long-term corporate bond rate has been altered in an ad 
hoc fashion in order to make the rate react more quickly to changes in 
short-term interest rates. This change makes the results less deflationary 
than they otherwise would be over the 1969-75 simulation period. 
The assumed desired output path is one very close to the real GNP pro- 
jected in the 1970 Economic Report, Table 13 (p. 79). In the Report this 
path is called a "projection," but the surrounding discussion makes clear 
that the projection is thought of  as the desired path. Minor differences 
between the desired path used in this paper and that used in the Report 
arise, first, from constructing a smooth quarterly path from the annual 
projections in the Report, and, second, from specifying a quarterly path 
for 1969. The 1969 path was constructed in such as way as to be consistent 
with the 1970-75 path in the Report and also, in so far as possible, with the 
testimony, which lacked explicit numbers, of members of the Nixon  ad- 
ministration before the  Joint Economic  Committee in February 1969.10 
The desired path of real GNP in the 1970 Economic  Report is not exactly 
the path that would have been specified in early 1969. By late 1969, when 
the Report was being written, the output gap was somewhat larger, and the 
progress in slowing inflation somewhat smaller, than had been hoped early 
in the year. Nevertheless, these differences are minor for the purposes of 
this paper, and so no attempt has been made to adjust the projections of 
the 1970 Economic Report to what they might have been had they been 
made in early 1969.11 
9. Details of the various  assumptions  used in the simulations  are listed in a mimeo- 
graphed  appendix  available  from the author. 
10. 1969 JEC Hearings, Pt. 2. 
11. In principle  the desired  path should itself be the result of an optimization  pro- 
cedure.  For example,  if a loss function  were  specified  in terms of the output gap and the 
rate of inflation,  it might  well be that the total loss would be lower  if the output  gap were 
smaller  but maintained  longer, or larger  but maintained  not as long, than assumed  by 
the desired  path for purposes  of this paper.  Since  less inflation  and more output  are both 
desired,  the problem  should  always  be approached  in terms  of finding  the optimal  trade- 280  William Poole 
The desired path has real GNP moderately below potential until 1973:1, 
at which time it begins to follow the path of potential GNP  as defined in 
the 1970 Economic  Report.'2  The simulation was then used to find the path 
for the money stock required to achieve the desired path of real GNP, given 
the assumptions discussed above. (Money stock is defined throughout this 
paper as demand deposits plus currency and is assumed to be the exog- 
enous monetary policy  variable in the model.) The procedure used was 
purely one of trial and error: The money stock was adjusted from one trial 
simulation to the next until the desired GNP path was obtained. The end 
result of this process will be called "simulation B" and the path of the 
money stock in this simulation will be called "money path B." The results 
of simulation B are shown in Figure 1. 
The approach underlying simulation B places greater emphasis on  out- 
put than on the rate of inflation, even though in principle equal attention 
should be paid to both.  One reason for this greater emphasis is that the 
exposition is easier if it starts from a desired output path and then examines 
the implication of that path for the rate of inflation. A second reason is 
that the political realities seem to point primarily to the maintenance of 
output at levels close to potential and secondarily to the reduction of the 
rate of inflation. In other words, it seems likely that output goals will be 
changed only marginally if necessary to obtain a more rapid reduction in 
inflation, while inflation rates much higher than expected would be tol- 
erated if necessary to maintain output.'3 
RESULTS  OF  THE  SIMULATION 
In money path B, which is shown at the bottom of Figure 1, the level of 
the money stock is below the actual level in the first and second quarters 
of 1969 and above the actual level in the next four quarters. But in 1970:2, 
money path B is only $3.8 billion above the actual money stock for that 
quarter, a difference  in growth rates during the six quarters 1969:1-1970:2 
off, rather  than in terms of finding  an "acceptable"  trade-off.  An acceptable  trade-off 
simply may not exist if what is thought to be acceptable  is beyond the realm of the 
possible. Discussion of the optimality of the projections  in the 1970 Economic  Report 
is, however,  beyond the scope of this study. 
12. Pp. 79 and 85. 
13. This view is reinforced  by the fact that the 1970 Economic  Report  provides an 
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Figure 1.  Goal-Gradualism Simulations of GNP, Change in GNP 
Deflator, and Velocity and Growth Rate of Money, 1969-75 
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of only 1.3 percent. Thus it appears that actual monetary policy in that 
period, while not precisely conforming to money path B, nevertheless has 
the same general level of restrictiveness. 
In qualitative terms, the difference was relatively minor. In part, in the 
first half of 1969, the actual path was probably higher than intended, and 
therefore  higher than money path B, as a result of errors in the preliminary 
data on the money stock. Except for these errors, policy might well have 
produced slower monetary growth in the first half of  1969. Also,  going 
from the 7 percent growth rate of 1968 to the zero rate in money path B for 
1969:1 might have produced excessive strains in the financial markets. 
Money path B may be described as a policy of stringency for four to six 
quarters followed by ease, although some may quarrel with attaching the 
label "stringent" to the initial part of this path. But the argument  would be 
that, given a rate of inflation of about 5 percent in 1969, and given an aver- 
age growth rate of money of 6.7 percent for the two years ending December 
1968, the initial part of money path B is indeed very restrictive,  even though 
the money growth rates are not low by historical standards. 
The logic of a policy of stringency followed by ease can be readily under- 
stood. The sooner some excess capacity develops, the sooner inflation will 
begin to subside. Once the rate of inflation slows, inflationary  expectations 
begin to be revised downward, which tends to dampen inflation even fur- 
ther. But as this process of slowing inflation and dampening of expecta- 
tions gets underway, considerable monetary ease is necessary to prevent 
output from falling far below potential. For while the rate of inflation is 
declining, the level of prices is still rising substantially.  Thus if the economy 
is to remain on the desired output path, money balances must be provided 
to compensate for the higher price level. Keeping the money stock con- 
stant when the price level is rising at a 5 percent rate has roughly the same 
depressing influence on output as a money stock that falls at a 5 percent 
rate when the price level is constant. 
The high growth rates in money path B in 1971 and 1972 are required, 
first, because the growth rate of output must be greater than the growth 
rate of potential output in order to eliminate the GNP  gap, and second, 
because the price level is still rising significantly, though at a steadily de- 
clining rate. The high growth rates of money in 1971 and 1972 are not sur- 
prising considering that desired real output grows by 4.9 percent between 
1970:4 and 1971  :4, and then by 6.8 percent in the following year. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, the income velocity of money is actually rising over Gradualism:  A Mid-Course View  283 
this period from 4.77 in 1970:4 to 5.00 in 1972:4. These figures may be 
compared with an actual income velocity of 4.76 in 1970:2. 
Once potential output is approached in 1973, it would seem that mone- 
tary growth could slow down, since the desired rate of growth of output is 
about 4 percent. The fact that the growth rate of money path B actually 
rises may be a spurious result; the high and rising growth rates in 1974-75 
are especially suspect. But the general result of a higher growth rate in 
1973-75 than in 1971-72 is not unreasonable, and the forces in the model 
producing this result are identifiable. First, the assumed fiscal policy is 
quite restrictive, but this factor should not be overemphasized. In simu- 
lations run without assuming the tax cuts of  simulation B, the full em- 
ployment surplus came  out  more than double that  of  simulation B  in 
1973-75, and yet the money growth rates were less than a percentage point 
higher. As a rough guess, fiscal assumptions involving a zero fuli employ- 
ment surplus might lower the money growth rates by 1.0 to 1.5 percentage 
points from money path B. 
Probably more important than "fiscal drag" is the interaction of mone- 
tary and real forces affecting investment. First, inflation is continuing, al- 
though at declining rates, thus absorbing nominal money balances. Sec- 
ond, short-term interest rates, after rising with the rapid growth of output 
in 1971 and 1972, begin to fall after 1973, thereby absorbing more money 
balances through the interest elasticity of the demand for money. Third, 
since the corporate bond rate in the model is an eighteen-quarter  distrib- 
uted lag on the commercial paper rate, the bond rate lags behind short- 
term rates and so investment is not stimulated very much in the short run 
by the monetary ease. 
Of crucial importance is the interaction of the slow movement of the 
corporate bond rate with the declining rate of inflation. A key term in the 
cost  of  capital determining expenditures on  producers' durables is  the 
corporate bond rate minus the expected rate of inflation. And the expected 
rate of inflation is a twelve-quarter  distributed lag on the actual rate. It is 
difficult  to get the bond rate to move down as fast as the decline in the rate 
of inflation. With insufficient monetary ease, the cost of capital actually 
rises, thus reducing investment and depressing aggregate demand. 
A few numbers may illuminate the operation of the model. For simula- 
tion B the commercial paper rate reaches a peak of 7.87 percent in 1973  :2 
and thereafter  declines to 5.90 percent in 1975:4. The corporate bond rate 
reaches a peak of 8.24 in 1973:3, but declines very slowly to 7.92 in 1975:4. 284  William  Poole 
As a result of the long distributed lag in the bond rate equation, the bond 
rate in 1975 is still being affected in an important way by the rising com- 
mercial paper rate in the period from 1971 to 1973. With the combination 
of the sluggish movement of the corporate bond rate and the declining rate 
of inflation, the real rate of interest that influences the cost of capital for 
producers' durable equipment moves hardly at all. The expected rate of 
inflation reaches a peak in 1970:4 and declines steadily thereafter. The real 
rate of interest does not reach a peak until 1975: 1 and then declines slightly. 
This result occurs in spite of the ad hoc adjustment  (noted above) made to 
speed the response of the corporate bond rate equation. 
Although  the monetary ease represented by money path B  does  not 
stimulate spending by reducing the real rate of interest, it has a substantial 
effect through the stock market sector of the model. The growth rate of the 
money stock is a variable in the equation determining the dividend-price 
ratio, which in turn affects the cost of capital for producers' durable equip- 
ment and structures, and also affects household net wealth and thereby 
consumption. The steady decline in the dividend-price ratio softens the 
impact of the decline in the expected rate of inflation, but even so the cost 
of capital for producers' durable equipment does not reach a peak until 
1975: 1. The impact on the cost of capital for producers' structures  is, how- 
ever, much greater and this variable declines over the whole simulation 
period. 
Whatever the validity of  these features of  the model,  it appears that 
simulation B does not involve an unreasonable increase in consumption. 
For 1975:4 the simulated ratio of real consumption to real GNP is 0.663, 
whereas this ratio stood at 0.642 in 1969:4.14  Nevertheless, there is some 
reason to believe that, if permitted to run long enough, the model might 
exhibit  anti-damped oscillations if  all  of  the  exogenous  variables were 
growing at steady rates. Unfortunately, not enough experimentation has 
been done with the model either to confirm or to reject this conjecture. If 
the model is indeed going through the downward phase of an oscillation 
in 1974-75 in simulation B, as seems not unlikely, then there is a ready 
explanation for the surprisingly  high growth rates in money path B in those 
years. 
But if the model exaggerates the effect on investment of a declining rate 
of inflation, this effect is nevertheless  likely in the years ahead to be an im- 
14. The consumption variable referred  to is the definition of consumption  in the 
national  income accounts.  It is calculated  from the model's  basic consumption  variable, 
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portant one tending to reduce velocity. From the fourth quarter of 1964 
to the fourth quarter of 1968, nominal GNP rose by 38 percent, while the 
money stock rose by 22 percent. Given the rapid development of infla- 
tionary expectations in this period, interest rates did not rise fast enough 
to prevent a capital expenditures  boom. In the years ahead it appears likely 
that the economy will go through the reverse of the 1964-68 process. As 
inflationary expectations wane, monetary growth will have to be greater 
than nominal income growth to obtain interest rates low enough to support 
investment. 
It is helpful to look at the detailed implications of these results for veloc- 
ity. With the rapid expansion of the money stock in money path B, velocity 
falls from 5.00 in 1972:4 to a 1975:4 level of 4.69, only slightly below the 
actual velocity in  1970:2.  While the fluctuations in the  growth rate of 
money path B should not be taken too seriously, the velocity calculations 
show that the 7.4 percent growth rate of money path B, taking the 1969-75 
period as a whole, can be viewed as unreasonably high only if it is success- 
fully argued that (a) the income elasticity of the demand for money in the 
model-assumed  to be unity-is  too high, and/or (b) the estimated rate of 
inflation is too high. 
The income elasticity of the demand for money is subject to controversy. 
Using postwar data alone, one can easily obtain estimates below unity.'5 
But  most  of  the  argument within  the  economics  profession  has  been 
whether or not the income elasticity is greater than unity. This issue cannot 
be resolved at this time. 
It is a simple matter, however, for the reader to adjust the simulation B 
results for a different income elasticity of demand for money. An elasticity 
of 0.8, for example, is one-fifth below that assumed in the model; money 
path B would thus have its growth rates adjusted down accordingly by 
one-fifth. A 5 percent money growth rate would be adjusted to 4 percent, 
a 10 percent rate to 8 percent, and so on.'6 
Now  consider the possibility that the simulated rate of inflation is too 
high. If this rate were in fact 1 percentage point lower than the simulation 
15.  David  E. W. Laidler,  The Demand for  Money:  Theories and Evidence  (Interna- 
tional Textbook Co., 1969),  p. 106. 
16. This argument  is not strictly  correct  since the assumption  of an income elasticity 
of, say, 0.8 would lead to a lower estimate for the interest  elasticity of demand using 
postwar  data.  In the 1970-72  period  of the simulation,  when  interest  rates  generally  rose, 
the growth rates in money path B would be reduced  by less than one-fifth, while the 
growth  rates  in 1973-75,  a period  of falling  interest  rates,  would  be reduced  by more  than 
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results for the entire period, then money path B could have a growth rate 
about 1 percentage point lower. The result would not be a full percentage 
point lower, however, since a lower rate of inflation would require a more 
rapid fall in nominal interest rates that would in turn absorb more nominal 
balances through the interest elasticity of the demand for money. 
Many observers will feel, however, that, if anything, the inflation rate in 
simulation B is optimistic. In simulation B the maximum output gap, which 
occurs in 1971  :2, is only about 3.6 percent of potential output, compared 
with an actual gap of about 9.3 percent in 1958:2. Furthermore, past busi- 
ness cycle experience would not in general support the result of a declining 
rate of inflation both during the 1971-72 period of rapid output expansion 
and during the 1973-75 period when the output gap is zero. 
The progress in reducing inflation shown in Figure 1 will strike many as 
disappointingly slow. However, the fact that the model shows continuing 
progress even after output returns to potential in 1973 is quite encouraging. 
The basic reason for this result is the Phillips curve in the model. In simula- 
tion B the unemployment rate in 1973-75 settles down to about 4.6 percent 
on the conventional definition of the unemployment rate. At this rate the 
model's Phillips curve produces a steady-state  rate of inflation of about 2.6 
percent, thus explaining the gradual decline in the rate of inflation in simu- 
lation B. The fact that unemployment in the simulation in 1973-75 is some- 
what higher than the 3.8 percent assumed consistent with the definition of 
potential output in the Economic Report is partly a result of minor differ- 
ences in the assumptions about population growth and productivity growth 
between the Economic  Report and the model. It is also partly a result of the 
long lags influencing labor force participation in the model, which prevent 
the simulation from reaching a steady state even by 1975. Given the Phil- 
lips curve, the only way to obtain a more rapid reduction of inflation in the 
model is to accept greater unemployment. 
Some may feel that greater unemployment should be accepted in order 
to obtain a more rapid reduction in inflation.'7  In spite of the importance 
17. For example, in the Aug. 26, 1970, issue of "Quarterly  Economic Trends," a 
publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, simulations  based on the St. 
Louis model are presented  for three  alternative  growth  rates  of the money stock-6  per- 
cent, 3 percent,  and 0 percent.  In the text of this release  (p. 5), the simulated  inflation 
rates are discussed  and by implication  the 3 percent  money growth  rate favored.  How- 
ever, the text does not make  clear that in early 1972  the output gap simulated  by the St. 
Louis model (p. 6) would be about 10 percent of potential with the 3 percent  money 
growth  policy and over 6 percent  of potential  with the 6 percent  policy. Any discussion 
of policy alternatives  ought surely to point out at least the estimated  implications  for 
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of this issue, value judgments on the desirability of a particular inflation- 
unemployment trade-off have been deliberately avoided in this paper; in 
addition, there has been no effort to explore systematically the implications 
for inflation of alternative output paths. However, some notion of the ex- 
tent of the output loss in the model that is required to achieve a lower rate 
of inflation may be obtained below. 
One final way of looking at simulation B is to compare it with United 
States historical experience since 1867, the first date for which reasonably 
complete monetary data are available. Historical periods with relatively 
high monetary growth are reported in Table 2.18  The two intervals after the 
Second World War do not involve high growth rates by historical stan- 
dards, but have been included in the table simply to  offer some recent 
periods. These historical growth rates may be compared with money path 
B which, using continuous compounding, has a growth rate of 5.8 percent 
from 1968:4 through 1972:4; of 9.5 percent from 1972:4 through 1975:4; 
and of 7.4 percent over the whole seven-year period. The growth rate in 
Table 2.  Periods of Rapid Monetary Expansion in the United States, 
1878-1969 
Annual  rate of growth  in percent 
Growth of 
Period  money stocka 
1878-1883  11.7 
1884-1892  6.0 
1896-1907  9.0 
January  1915-January  1920  13.8 
January  1922-January  1926  6.1 
March 1933-March  1937  12.2 
January  1938-January  1946  15.5 
January  1950-January  1953  4.4 
January  1963-January  1969  4.7 
Sources: 1878-1946-Milton  Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary  History of the United States, 
1867-1960 (Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963), Table A-1, 
pp. 704-18;  1950-69-Board  of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
a.  Calculations for 1878-1907 are based on annual data for money stock broadly defined (currency plus 
both demand and time deposits at commercial banks). Calculations for 1915-69 are based on monthly data 
for money stock narrowly defined (currency  plus demand deposits). 
18. The periods selected are all of substantial  duration-at  least three years. Much 
higher growth rates occurred over certain shorter intervals. Also, the periods were 
defined  over full years. In most cases, slightly higher  growth rates could have been re- 
ported by defining  periods as a few months longer or shorter  than a full year. All the 
growth rates  in  Table  2  were  calculated under the  assumption of  continuous 
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money path B, while not unprecedented  in peacetime, is clearly abnormally 
high, judged by experience since the Civil War. This observation alone 
would seem to discredit simulation B. 
But the examination of the historical record cannot end with the com- 
parison of money growth rates. For there is no historical parallel to the 
situation in simulation B, with its maintenance of essentially full employ- 
ment following an extended period of accelerating inflation. Previous in- 
flations of substantially lesser magnitudes have generally been followed by 
protracted slumps. Money path B can be compared with past money paths 
only if the difference  between the output path in simulation B and past out- 
put paths is also kept in mind. 
Instrument-Gradualism 
In his Newsweek column of January 20, 1969, Milton Friedman wrote: 
"I therefore now recommend a two-step move-first,  to about 7 percent a 
year [monetary growth] and then to 4 or 5 percent a year." This recommen- 
dation is an example of instrument-gradualism,  and is motivated by the 
argument that,  given the  high rate of  growth of  money  in  1967-68,  it 
would be too great a shock to reduce the growth rate of money in one step 
to a steady long-run rate. 
SIMULATION  RESULTS 
In  order to  obtain some feel for what Friedman's policy would have 
meant had it been followed starting in 1969, the model was simulated un- 
der two assumptions of a gradually falling money growth rate. In simula- 
tion  C the assumed growth rate is 6.5 percent in  1969:1, 6.0 percent in 
1969:2, and so on with reductions of 0.5 percentage point every quarter 
until a 4.0 percent rate is reached in 1970:2. Thereafter,  through the end of 
the simulation period in 1975:4, the growth rate of money is held steady 
at 4.0 percent. In simulation D the growth rate of money is 6.5 percent in 
1969:1,  and 6.0 percent from  1969:2 through 1975:4.  Since the growth 
rate of money from December 1967 to December 1968 was about 7 per- 
cent, the two assumed policies with gradual adjustment starting at 1969:1 
seem to follow the spirit of Friedman's recommendation as well as bracket- 
ing its numerical extremes. 
Within the model the results of either policy can only be regarded as 
disappointing. Figure 2 shows the simulated paths of real GNP,  of the Gradualism: A Mid-Course View  289 
Figure 2.  Instrument-Gradualism  Simulations of GNP, Change in GNP 
Deflator, and the Growth Rate of Money, 1969-75 
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rates of change of the GNP deflator, and of the growth rates of the money 
stock for the  assumed instrument-gradualist policies.'9 In simulation C, 
real GNP  rises by $108 billion over the entire seven-year period, but by 
the end of the period is $116 billion, or 12.2 percent, below potential out- 
put; the rate of increase in the GNP deflator declines from about 5 percent 
in 1969 to about 1 percent in 1975. The output path in simulation D is, of 
course, higher, but real GNP in 1975:4 is still $75 billion, or 7.9 percent, 
below potential. It may be recalled that at the bottom of the 1958 and 1961 
recessions, output was  9.3  percent and 9.4 percent, respectively, below 
potential. 
The forces in the model producing these results are, of course, largely 
the same as those analyzed at length in connection with simulation B. It is 
useful, however, especially in connection with simulation C, to  examine 
the simulated inflation rate carefully. 
In simulation C a significant GNP  gap does not develop until 1970:2. 
It then widens steadily to 5.8 percent in 1973: 1 and ultimately to 12.2 per- 
cent in 1975:4. Since inflation seems remarkably obstinate in the model, 
one  might  question whether the  model  overestimates the  amount that 
would occur with such a large gap maintained for so long a period. Perhaps 
the model does overestimate the inflation that would occur in these circum- 
stances, but this conclusion is by no means clear. In simulation C the gap 
does not lie very far outside its range during the period used to estimate 
the model,  and therefore there must be at least a presumption that the 
model correctly represents what would happen in such circumstances. For 
purposes of comparison, it may be noted that, after reaching 9.3 percent in 
1958:2, the output gap fell to 4.7 percent in 1960:1, rose again to 9.4 per- 
cent in 1961:1, and was still as high as 5.2 percent in 1963:1 before falling 
steadily to near zero in 1965:3. Even with this output gap it took five years 
for the inflation rate to fall 2.6 percentage points from the 3.7 percent rate 
in. 1957 to the 1.1 percent rate in 1962; after 1962, even though an output 
gap persisted until 1965, the inflation rate stopped declining and actually 
crept up slightly.20 
Since the output gap in simulation C remains fairly small until 1973, the 
19. To prevent  the figure  from becoming  cluttered,  velocity  has not been graphed.  In 
simulation  C, velocity is 4.61 in 1969:  1, rises to a peak of 5.09 in 1973:4, and then falls 
to 5.00 in 1975:4. In simulation  D, velocity  is 4.61 in 1969:  1, rises  to 5.07 in 1973:2, and 
then falls to 4.85 in 1975:4. 
20. All of the inflation rates cited in this sentence  refer to the change in the GNP 
deflator  for the year in question  over the previous  year. Gradualism:  A Mid-Course View  291 
reduction in inflation that occurs in the simulation in the 1970-72 period 
does not seem excessively slow. Any argument that the simulated inflation 
is too high must focus on 1973-75. Even if this view is taken, however, and 
a zero rate of inflation is assumed for 1973-75, the 4 percent money growth 
in simulation C would then permit real GNP simply to grow at about the 
same rate as potential, maintaining the gap already existing in 1973: 1. All 
of this analysis would,  of course, be altered by assuming a lower income 
elasticity in the demand for money function. 
Another interesting aspect of  these  simulations is the  price level  ad- 
vantage gained by money path B as compared with money paths C and D. 
The figures are dramatic: The rate of inflation (GNP deflator) in B is below 
that in C from 1969: 1 through 1972: 1, and below that in D from 1969: 1 
through 1974:2; the level of the deflator in B is below that in C from 1969: 1 
through 1973:4, and below that in D for the entire simulation period. 
When analyzed carefully, these results make perfectly good sense. The 
advantage realized by B arises because the output gap in B appears early 
in the simulation period. In simulation B real GNP falls below potential in 
1969:3, while in C and D  a gap does not appear until 1970:1. In B real 
GNP is below that in C from 1969:1 through 1971:2, but only by a maxi- 
mum of $13.5 billion (1.8 percent of potential) in 1970:2. Similarly, real 
GNP is lower in B than in D from 1969: 1  through 1972:3, with a maximum 
difference of $19.4 billion (2.5 percent of potential) in 1971:2. In accord 
with the McCracken statement cited earlier and the views of many other 
economists,  the  early reduction in  inflation reduces inflationary expec- 
tations,  thereby tending to  reduce inflation still  further in  subsequent 
quarters. 
The  mechanism producing this  result in  the  model  is  fairly simple. 
Changes in the wage rate depend primarily on the current unemployment 
rate and on the lagged inflation rate. In turn, the inflation rate depends 
primarily  on a distributed lag of current and past changes in the wage rate. 
Thus, an early increase in unemployment reduces the increase in the wage 
rate, which in turn reduces the inflation rate for subsequent quarters. This 
timing effect is magnified by the fact that the lower output in 1969-70 in 
simulation B as compared with C and D  occurs at a strategic time when 
unemployment is especially low, and therefore the model is operating in a 
relatively steep section of the Phillips curve. For example, in 1970:2, the 
quarter of the maximum output difference  between B and C in this period, 
the model's unemployment rate for B is 4.0 percent while the rate for C is 292  William Poole 
3.7 percent, a small but important difference given the steepness of  the 
Phillips curve at these unemployment rates. 
A  REFORMULATION  OF  INSTRUMENT-GRADUALISM 
Where does  this  analysis leave the  policy  of  instrument-gradualism? 
First, it is important to recognize that such a policy is designed to cope 
with uncertainty. The argument is that there is too much uncertainty about 
the structure  of the economy, including the response lags to policy changes, 
and about the occurrence of random shocks to permit an active, aggressive 
stabilization policy. This view clearly has great merit; even policy activists 
do not claim that policy makers can hope to forecast and then offset every 
small disturbance. The debate is not over a matter of principle but rather 
over the degree to which an aggressive stabilization policy can be success- 
fully pursued. 
However attractive the instrument-gradualist  argument, it simply does 
not  fit the current situation without  careful amendment. In  early  1969 
economists of all persuasions agreed that the 1965-68 inflationary experi- 
ence produced initial conditions for 1969 that guaranteed continued infla- 
tion for some period of time. There was practically no uncertainty over the 
forecast that inflation would continue to be a serious problem for several 
years. 
In this situation a normative argument arose as to how large an output 
gap ought to be accepted in exchange for reduction in inflation. But more 
important for the instrument-gradualist  approach was the positive  argu- 
ment over how much inflation would occur, and for how long, and over 
the amount of reduction in inflation associated with a given output gap. 
The uncertainty relevant for the instrument-gradualist argument, there- 
fore, was considerably influenced by the unfavorable initial conditions of 
1969. 
Friedman recognized these unfavorable conditions and therefore modi- 
fied his prescription of steady monetary growth by urging a two-step reduc- 
tion in the rate of money growth to a steady long-run rate. The simulations 
above suggest that this recommendation was faulty in two respects. First, 
a sharp reduction in the money growth rate followed by a subsequent in- 
crease appears to  promote better GNP  and price level paths over time. 
Secondly, the simulations suggest that the 4 percent rate, and perhaps even 
the 6 percent rate, of growth of money is too low over the next few years. Gradualism:  A Mid-Course View  293 
These results flow from the unsatisfactory initial conditions and the long 
adjustment lags in the model. 
The conviction that adjustment lags are long, variable, and uncertain is 
at the heart of the instrument-gradualist  position. If much weight is given 
to the "long" part of this position, then the instrument-gradualist  recom- 
mendation ought not to involve the same sort of policies that might have 
been appropriate  in a year with favorable initial conditions, such as 1965. 
Instead, the recommendation might be to start with money path B, smooth 
it, and then substantially reduce rates of growth compared with it in the 
1973-75 period, unless evidence accumulates before 1973 suggesting that 
its high rates are really necessary. This recommendation recognizes that 
money  path  B  was  determined by  experimenting with  a  deterministic 
model; the introduction of uncertainty clearly argues for smoothing and 
avoiding extremes. 
The simulation results discussed above do not destroy the case for in- 
strument-gradualism,  but rather require that it be stated more generally 
than it has been in the past. Some minimum allowance ought to be made 
for important factors known to be operating, such as the initial conditions 
facing policy makers in early 1969. The general problem, of course, is to 
decide when something is  "known to  be  operating," but in the specific 
instance of early 1969 the existence and prospective persistence of infla- 
tionary pressures were known. 
THE  SHIFT  OF  POLICY  IN  1969 
In  any event, it  is  clear that  actual policy has  not  been instrument- 
gradualist. Indeed, it can be argued that, considering monetary and fiscal 
policy together, the shift in policy in 1968-69 was the most deflationary 
since 1947. 
By the beginning of 1969 the economy had gone a long way toward ad- 
justing in real terms to a higher rate of inflation. Interest rates had risen to 
reflect  the inflation, wage contracts provided for future wage increases high 
enough to offset much of the expected inflation, and the rate of growth of 
real output had declined to  more or less normal levels from the above- 
normal rates of increase previously prevailing. From the second quarter of 
1967 through the second quarter of 1968, real GNP  grew at a 5.0 percent 
annual rate, whereas the rate was 3.5 percent from the second to the fourth 294  William Poole 
quarters of 1968. By the beginning of 1969 the adjustment to inflation was 
far from complete, but it had made considerable progress. 
Probably the best measure of the shift in monetary policy is the extent 
to which the rate of growth in the money stock has declined. The change, 
rather than the level, of the rate of growth seems to be the appropriate 
measure, because after a sufficiently  long adjustment  period, it appears that 
the monetary growth rate determines  primarily  the rate of inflation and has 
relatively little effect on the rate of growth of real output. 
The tax surcharge of 1968 and the sharp reduction in the rate of mone- 
tary growth starting in early 1969 started the process of adjustment to a 
lower rate of inflation. Initially there was little noticeable effect because the 
forces tending to  produce less inflation were overwhelmed by the con- 
tinuance of the previous adjustment to higher inflation. Furthermore, as 
noted in the previous section, the extensive talk about gradualism  may have 
slowed down the response to the restrictive policies. 
That monetary policy did become very restrictive can be seen from the 
following figures. From February 1968 to February 1969, the money stock 
grew at a 6.85 percent annual rate, but in the next twelve months-from 
February 1969 to February 1970-the  money stock grew at a 1.52 percent 
rate, a difference of 5.33 percentage points in the growth rates. Such a de- 
cline in  growth rates, measured by comparing twelve-month periods to 
eliminate temporary aberrations,  has been exceeded only on rare occasions 
since 1947: in January 1948, when the decline was 5.46 percentage points; 
and in several months of  1959, when the maximum difference in twelve- 
month growth rates was 6.64 percentage points in July.2'  If the comparison 
is made for the twenty-four months ending, and the twelve months follow- 
ing, February 1969, then the deceleration of monetary growth is found to 
be 5.15 percentage  points. Based on this method of calculation, this deceler- 
ation is greater than that for any other month in the postwar period22  ex- 
cept for the figure for July 1959, which is nearly identical at 5.13 percentage 
noints. 
21. The dates refer to the last month of the first twelve-month  period. With this 
method  of dating,  the 1969  slowdown  described  at the beginning  of the paragraph  would 
be dated February  1969. 
22. Since the money stock series  used for this analysis  begins  in 1947,  the first  month 
for which  the twenty-four/twelve-month  calculation  can be made  is January  1949.  All of 
the growth  rates reported  in this paragraph  are based on the assumption  of continuous 
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The shift in fiscal policy has also been substantial. According to estimiates 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the full employment federal gov- 
ernment budget surplus has  gone  from minus  $12.0 billion in  1967 to 
$9.7 billion in 1969 (calendar years used throughout).23  The full employ- 
ment surplus  estimates for the same two years appearing  in a paper by Okun 
and Teeters are quite similar, even after the authors make a number of ad- 
justments designed to improve the conventional full employment surplus 
measure.24  However, the full employment surplus is declining in the first 
half of 1970 to an estimated level of $31/2  billion.25 
It appears, then, that the full employment budget surplus rose by over 
$20 billion between 1967 and 1969, a swing of roughly 2.5 percent of po- 
tential. This dollar increase was the largest for any three-year period since 
1947, and may be compared with the increase from $3.3 billion in 1958 to 
$13.2 billion in 1960, a change of $9.9 billion (1.8 percent of potential), and 
the increase from minus  $7.9 billion in  1953 to  $6.3 billion  in  1956, a 
change of $14.2 billion (3.4 percent of potential).26  Thus while the level of 
the full employment surplus for 1969 was not as high as that for 1960, the 
change in the surplus for the three-year periods was about twice as large. 
Thus,  whatever  the  advantages  of  instrument-gradualism-and  the 
simulation results suggest that such advantages are nonexistent in the cur- 
rent economic situation-there  can be no doubt that it is impossible to de- 
scribe economic policy since 1969 as instrument-gradualist.  The problem 
facing policy makers in 1970-71 is to  follow  expansionary policies long 
enough to undo some of the deflationary impact of the 1969 policies but 
not so long as to encourage a resumption of inflationary  boom conditions. 
23. Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis, "Federal  Budget  Trends,  Period Ending 2nd 
Quarter  1970,"  p. 2. 
24. Arthur M. Okun and Nancy H. Teeters, "The Full Employment Surplus Re- 
visited," Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity (1:1970), pp. 77-110; see esp. Table 
3, p. 106. 
25. Nancy H. Teeters, "Budgetary  Outlook at Mid-Year 1970," this volume, pp. 
303, 305.  The Teeters  estimates  may  be compared  with the $6.5 billion  estimate  of the full 
employment  surplus  for 1970  made by the Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis, "Federal 
Budget  Trends  ...  2nd Quarter,  1970,"  p. 2. 
26. The 1958-60 estimate is  based on the full employment surplus (unadjusted) 
estimates in Okun and Teeters, "Full Employment  Surplus Revisited," Table 2, pp. 
104-05; the 1953-56  comparison  and other  data prior  to 1955:  3 are from  Keith Carlson, 
"Estimates  of the High-Employment  Budget: 1947-1967,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. 
Louis  Review,  Vol. 49 (June 1967), p. 10. Comments  and 
Discussion 
R. A. Gordon: I must confess to  a certain amount of puzzlement about 
this paper. For one thing, I am not sure I know what is intended by the 
word "gradualism."  With respect to gradualism on goals, in what sense did 
this begin in 1968?  Walter Heller's lectures at Harvard stressed the need for 
continuous adjustment of the level of activity: Full employment was the 
chief job  of the Council of Economic Advisers and the council, in effect, 
knew more or less how to do it. 
In that sense, the council has espoused gradualism on goals for quite 
some time. It was merely a question of getting close to full employment in 
order to be able to practice it. I get the feeling that what is actually meant 
by gradualism on goals is simply what I would call the operation of the 
ratchet effect on the goal of full employment. The longer the period of high 
employment, the more difficult it becomes for the policy makers to accept, 
or to risk the possibility of, a large increase in unemployment. As I see it, 
the emergence of gradualism with respect to goals is simply the increased 
importance of the full employment goal. 
Simulation A-the  postmortem of 1969-70-illustrates  that we have no 
comparable experience with  prolonged  periods  of  unemployment of  4 
percent or less. Indeed, I would like to emphasize a favorite theme of mine: 
We need to pay more attention to the time sequence of observations in our 
econometric work. An unemployment rate of 3.9 percent may mean one 
thing if it is an isolated observation. It may mean an entirely different  thing 
if it follows four consecutive years of 4 percent or lower unemployment. 
The period from December 1965, when 4 percent was reached, to January 
1970 was the longest period of 4 percent or lower unemployment in Ameri- 
can history-outside  of total war. We need to develop techniques for taking 
account of this in our econometric work. 
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In simulation B, the projected increase in the money supply for 1974-75 
is simply not credible. The 1971-73 figures, however, look to be in the right 
ball park. Interest rate expectations will change in the seventies. I wonder 
whether the long-term interest rate still involves too long a lag on the short- 
term interest rate and whether that is part of the problem in the money 
supply projections. I am also skeptical about the future behavior of velocity 
implied by the model. 
In simulations B, C, and D, the wage and price equations of the model 
play a key role; and I am not convinced of their validity. Finally, the labor 
force and productivity assumptions that give the high unemployment figure 
for 1973-75 in simulation B are not clear. 
If I may sum up on the general theme, I do not think a reference to a 
new gradualism on goals is the appropriate way of describing the subject. 
Instead, I would put part of the argument as follows: Political forces have 
imposed what is called gradualism  in goals on the federal government. This 
takes the form of a greatly increased emphasis on the goal of full employ- 
ment. Even though the monetary authorities may wish to control inflation, 
the thinking of the Federal Reserve Board about how far it may go in risk- 
ing a sharp rise in unemployment is far different today from what it was, 
say, in 1959-60. 
With respect to instruments, I do not know that anybody has argued 
that we must never use a nongradualist approach. Certainly, the changes 
in monetary policy that took place from 1968 to 1969, and the reversal in 
the latter part of 1969 to the spring of 1970, represent large changes in the 
use of monetary instruments, and similar cases can be found in the past. 
The same things could be said for fiscal policy. I do not know any law of 
economics that says large changes in monetary and fiscal policy should not 
be used, and they have been used in the past. They are entirely consistent 
with the gradualist approach to goals. 
David Fand: I think that William Poole's paper is thoughtful and stimu- 
lating; if the value of the Brookings Papers is to make people think in a 
concrete way about these problems, I think it serves the purpose very well. 
He forces us to work through the exercise and see how one deals with an 
inflationary economy and how one might go about trying to achieve the 
administration's goals. 
Poole focuses on a discrepancy  between gradualism  in tools and gradual- 
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could happen because the wrong instrument was used. For example, sta- 
bilizing the federal funds rate may be viewed as a gradualist policy, but it 
could easily result in putting out a lot of money. Monetary policy would 
then be viewed as gradualist when it was not. Thus when market interest 
rates are used as an indicator of policy, the authorities may believe that 
they are following gradualist policies when in fact they are not. This is not 
the kind of discrepancy that Poole is talking about. He is talking about a 
case where the right instrument is being used but a discrepancy still de- 
velops between gradualism in tools and in goals. This comes about because 
the economy is different: What looks like a very tough policy viewed in 
isolation may, in a very hopped-up economy, be in fact a mild policy. The 
point is to  distinguish this kind of discrepancy between tools  and goals 
from that in the first example. 
It seems to me the case for gradualism in the use of instruments is made 
partly on the grounds of  uncertainty. But it may also be made on the 
grounds that the real world is relatively stable and that a lot of the insta- 
bility comes from destabilizing policies. 
I was puzzled that the policy of 4 percent growth in the money supply 
resulted in so little real growth, so much inflation, such high velocity, and 
such high interest rates. I tried the same policy in the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve's model and the results were also surprising.  They were somewhere 
in between Poole's results and what I expected. Why do we get these seem- 
ingly strange results? 
The St. Louis model extrapolates a very high marginal velocity, which 
makes me wonder whether it is reliable for long projections into the future. 
For example, if velocity right now is approximately 4.8, eventually the St. 
Louis model will pull it up to about 5.8. But the FRB-MIT-Penn model does 
something very similar in Poole's projections, raising average velocity into 
1974 on a policy of 4 percent money growth. Clearly, even quite differently 
specified equations fitted to the fifties and sixties give that kind of result. So 
the question is, do we want to extrapolate the uptrend of velocity? I think 
there is reason to be cautious. 
If inflation slows to a rate between 2.5 and 3 percent a year, it would be 
reasonable to expect a decline in interest rates of about 20 percent. Such a 
decline in interest rates, assuming an elasticity of money balances of about 
0.5, would reduce velocity by about 8 to 10 percent, or to 4.4 from the cur- 
rent 4.8. This implies a different sequence from that given by the model, if 
this tendency for velocity to decline is partially offset by other tendencies. 
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interest rates, underpredicting  both in recent quarters. These may be two 
different  manifestations of the same mistake: The economy has had more 
inflationary momentum in it than the models have captured. Because of 
this the models underpredict prices and, in turn, price expectations and 
market interest rates. On the other hand, the rise in market interest rates in 
recent years may constitute a rise in real rates as well as an inflation pre- 
mium. Those who argue that it is, essentially, an inflation premium have 
difficulty  explaining the decline in the stock market. Those who argue that 
it is mostly an increase in real rates have difficulty explaining price level 
behavior. Both explanations leave something to be desired. 
If velocity does decline, monetary policy will be tighter than it will appear 
to be from the money supply figures. That is to say, a period may be ap- 
proaching when the dollar may be doing the work of only ninety or ninety- 
five cents. 
William Poole: Of course gradualism  is not new. What is new is the greater 
public acceptance of the fact that in fighting inflation policy makers have 
to be careful because they may have a big impact on employment. I think 
there is a change from the fifties when the nation had a similar problem. 
I share the misgivings of those who are presented with results of a model 
whose characteristics and structure are hard to understand. It is very diffi- 
cult to figure out what is going on in something as big as the FRB-MIT- 
Penn model. I know the characteristics  of a few of the equations and that 
is about the best I can do. I had to decide whether to spend time on the 
model or on a discussion of economic policy. It seemed better to talk about 
policy. 
I agree that the bond rate equation is a problem. An eighteen-quarter 
distributed lag is a long time. As I noted, I changed the original equation, 
which had an even slower response, but I am still unhappy with it. I don't 
know exactly what is causing the unemployment in the later years. And 
there are other things about these simulations that I do not like. What I 
tried to do, within my time constraint, was to run the model to see what it 
showed. 
I was surprised that R. A.  Gordon wondered who argued the instru- 
ment-gradualist case, because Milton  Friedman has been arguing it for 
years. So have a lot of other monetarists. And it is certainly true that my 
approach is very monetarist. I think there is a lot to be said for paying 
much more attention to the money stock in policy formulation. But if 4 
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it would produce a very serious output shortfall and do very serious long- 
run harm to this whole cause. 
My reaction to David Fand's comment that in a hopped-up economy a 
policy may look severe but in fact is mild is to state the matter quite the 
other way around. In a hopped-up economy a very tight policy will result 
from a growth rate for money that is historically reasonably high. A 4 per- 
cent growth rate of money, which might look  like a neutral or even ex- 
pansionary policy, would in fact produce a considerable shortfall of out- 
put. His comments on velocity come from calculations that he made with 
the 4 percent growth path of money. With the growth path of simulation B, 
velocity in fact returns to the 1970 level by 1975. I do not think that there 
is anything in this model that provides for a secular increase in velocity. 
The results with the 4 percent path simply reflect  the long lags in this model. 
These keep long-term interest rates high and hold down expenditures. 
General  Discussion 
Warren Smith said that he did not consider the Poole paper a monetarist 
analysis except in the sense that monetary aggregates were used to mea- 
sure monetary policies. He was surprised that an even faster growth in the 
money  supply was not required. He reasoned that this was a period in 
which the initial situation is  one  of  rapidly rising prices, with continu- 
ing increases throughout the period; fiscal policy is tight throughout the 
period. Therefore, the demand for money is determined by the growth in 
real output plus the increase in prices. What did surprise him is that the 
rapid increase in the money supply had so little effect on interest rates. The 
model apparently  has such long lags that, even over five years, interest rates 
do not come down. This has some unhappy results. Both business and resi- 
dential construction are depressed and the rapid increase in the stock of 
money seems to benefit only the stock market. He would question whether 
any  monetary  variable, working  through  the  stock  market, would  be 
powerful enough to drive the economy all by itself. 
Otto Eckstein found the distinction between instrument- and goal-grad- 
ualism an excellent one, but did not agree with the inflation-unemployment 
trade-off implied by the projections. It seems to take 61/2  percent unemploy- 
ment to bring the economy back to reasonable price stability by 1975. The 
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nate the next five years. The initial conditions disturb other models also 
but, by 1975, most of them return to normal. 
James Duesenberry pointed out that all the models have been fitted to 
data covering only the past twenty to twenty-five  years, a period of relatively 
slow growth in money and rising interest rates, while historically there have 
been periods of sharply different rates of growth in money. The models 
cannot analyze what happens if the recent slow growth process is reversed. 
There is no base line for knowing what is the right growth in the money 
supply. 
Lawrence Klein said that the message he got from the projection was 
that the money multiplier was not as large as many monetary economists 
believe. It takes a big input of money, when that is the only policy variable, 
to achieve full employment. 